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Although basic pension had for years failed to catch the imagination of policy 
makers in Greece, it was suddenly brought to the agenda in the context of the 
severe  crisis  raging  since  November  2009.  In  May  2010  the  government 
committed to a harsh austerity programme, aiming at fiscal consolidation, in 
return for a rescue package easing the  sovereign debt crisis. The July 2010 
pension reform, a key provision of the austerity programme, provided for the 
introduction of a near-universal basic pension from 2015. The paper attempts 
to explain why, paradoxically, the crisis made more realistic a universal basic 
pension in Greece. We argue, firstly, that social insurance pensions may be ripe 
for path-breaking reform if heavily subsidised in a non-transparent way, and, 
secondly,  that  any  progress  towards  basic  income  is  likely  to  be  gradual, 
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Pathways to a universal basic pension in Greece 
 
1. Introduction 
The  supranational  dimension  to  basic  income  is  undoubtedly  important.  In 
recent years, interest in age-specific basic income schemes at the level of the 
European Union is on the rise. Recent examples include Levy et al. (2007), who 
explored the implications of a basic income for children, and Goedemé and van 
Lancker (2009), who discussed options for a universal basic pension. 
Basic pensions can be defined as schemes where “the benefit is either flat rate 
(the same amount is paid to every retiree) or it depends only on years of work, 
but not on past earnings, nor does additional income in retirement change the 
value of basic pensions” (OECD, 2009). 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  such  schemes  are  not  very  common.  Among  OECD 
countries, thirteen are currently described as having a basic pension scheme. 
On  closer  inspection,  only  in  four  of  these  (the  Czech  Republic,  the 
Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway) is the basic pension universal – that is, 
paid at a flat rate, conditional on residency alone. In another four countries 
(Britain, Ireland, Japan and Luxembourg) the basic pension depends on career 
length,  and  is  reduced  proportionally  in  case  of  incomplete  contribution 
histories. Furthermore, in four countries (Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Korea) 
the basic pension is actually tested against other income, even though income 
thresholds tend to be relatively high, and withdrawal rates relatively low.
1 
The  hybrid  nature  of  most  basic  pension  schemes  reflects  the  fact  that 
pathways to basic income, including its age-specific variants, are always likely 
to  be  specific  to  national  contexts  (Jordan  et  al.,  2000).  In  this  spirit,  this 
paper analyses the rather tortuous process leading to the unexpected arrival of 
Greece to the club of countries with a basic pension. More specifically, the 
paper  discusses  the  current  state  and  future  prospects  of  a  universal  basic 
pension in Greece, in the context of the country’s severe economic crisis and in 
the light of the 2010 pension reform. 
On the eve of that reform, the outlook for Greek pensions was bleak. Future 
expenditure was estimated to reach 19.4% of GDP in 2035 and 24.1% in 2060, 
whereas in the rest of the European Union it was set to rise gently to 11.9% and 
12.6%  respectively  (EC,  2009).  While  the  optimal  level  of  pension  spending 
cannot  be  determined  a  priori  as  it  must  reflect  social  and  political 
preferences, such a burden on public finances was clearly unsustainable. The 
current  crisis  has  demonstrated  that  pension  deficits  of  this  scale  seriously 
undermine  inter-generational  equity  and  future  living  standards,  while  the 
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ensuing  fiscal  adjustment  threatens  political  stability  and  weakens  social 
cohesion. 
Furthermore, Greek pensions perform poorly with respect to intra-generational 
equity, i.e. within the current generation of retirees (EC, 2010). In a context of 
institutional fragmentation, pension entitlements differ enormously. As a result 
of  that,  workers  with  identical  contributory  records  are  eligible  for  vastly 
different pension benefits, depending on occupation, cohort or gender. At the 
same time, poverty in old age (23%) is well above the European average (20%), 
especially among the very old (31% and 23% in the 75+ age group respectively). 
It  appears  that  the  country’s  pension  system  is  failing  to  deploy  the  large 
resources it commands to meet fundamental distributional objectives. 
While Greek pensions are unsustainable as well as inequitable, recent attempts 
at significant reform had ground to a halt, or ended in outright failure. Pension 
reform returned to the top of the political agenda with a vengeance in the 
context  of  the  current  crisis.  Rapidly  escalating  from  November  2009,  the 
sovereign debt crisis made the cost of borrowing from international markets 
prohibitive.  The  €110  billion  rescue  package  agreed  in  May  2010  with  the 
European  Commission  (EC),  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  and  the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) was designed to cover the country’s entire 
borrowing  requirements  for  three  years.  In  return  of  that,  the  socialist 
government, in office since October 2009, signed a Memorandum of Economic 
and  Financial  Policies  which  contained  harsh  austerity  measures  including 
drastic pension reform. 
The reform raises the retirement age and contributory conditions for current 
workers, while it establishes a new pension structure from 2015. That amounts 
to a decisive break with Bismarckian social insurance: it provides for a modest 
basic pension which falls somewhat short of full universality, and introduces a 
contributory proportional pension which is less generous than social insurance 
pensions in the previous system but also more uniform across categories. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines government subsidies to 
pensions  in  the  current  system.  Section  3  recounts  the  evolution  of  basic 
pension ideas in Greece since the early 1990s. Section 4 discusses the 2010 
pension reform, including provisions for a new basic pension. Section 5 reviews 
the  positions  of  political  and  social  actors.  Section  6  concludes  with  a 
discussion of prospects for a universal basic pension in Greece. 
 
2. Government subsidies to the pension system 
Pensions  represent  Greece’s  backbone  of  social  protection,  providing 
households with 24.1% of their disposable income on average (ELSTAT, 2010). 
Not  much  remains  for  other  social  benefits  (such  as  unemployment,  family, 
sickness, housing and social assistance benefits), accounting between them for   3
a mere 3.7% of household disposable income. As the pension system is highly 
fragmented and fiscally unsustainable, this backbone is broken. 
Differences in treatment are pretty extreme, in terms of contribution rates, 
reference earnings, contributory requirements, replacement rates as well as 
the statutory retirement age, which for men varies from 45 to 65 years. While 
the  general  picture  is  complex,  systematic  cleavages  can  be  identified.  In 
general, pension rules favour the liberal professions over wage earners, public 
over private sector employees, unionised over precarious workers, the middle-
aged over the young, and men over (most) women. 
Furthermore, the safety net in old age is patchy. Non-contributory pensions are 
paid to farmers and to the non-insured, while recipients of a minimum pension 
may also be entitled to an income-tested supplement. More specifically, the 
main schemes are: (a) the social pension, or “pension to uninsured elderly”, 
aimed for those with no or low lifetime contributions; (b) the non-contributory 
basic pension to farmers, gradually phased out since 1998; (c) the pensioners’ 
social solidarity benefit ΕΚΑΣ, an income-tested supplement to low pensions, 
reserved  for  recipients  of  a  contributory  pension  except  farmers;  and  (d) 
minimum  pensions  to  those  with  sufficient  lifetime  contributions  for  a 
contributory pension, but too low to ensure their pension exceeds a certain 
minimum level. 
The  social  pension,  the  basic  pension  to  farmers  and  the  pensioners’  social 
solidarity benefit ΕΚΑΣ are funded out of general taxation rather than social 
contributions.  In  the  case  of  minimum  pensions,  the  non-contributory 
component  is  the  implicit  subsidy  intended  to  ensure  that  all  contributory 
pensions  reach  at  least  a  specified  minimum.  In  other  words,  the  implicit 
subsidy is a top-up to the contribution-related “organic pension” resulting from 
the strict application of the benefit formula. 
Table  1  shows  non-contributory  components  to  minimum  pensions,  including  
ΕΚΑΣ, allowances for a spouse and two dependent children, and the implicit 
subsidy (estimated as the difference between the minimum pension and the 
actuarially fair benefit for a low earner retiring with the minimum contributory 
record). Summing them all up, non-contributory components could reach €592 
monthly (80.4% of a typical minimum pension package) in 2007, depending on 
individual characteristics. 
[TABLE 1] 
Government subsidies are not restricted to funding non-contributory elements. 
As Table 2 indicates, total government support to the pension system amounted 
to €15,170 million in 2008, equivalent to a staggering 6.3% of GDP or 52.2% of 
total spending on pensions. While most of this was truly intended to fund non-
contributory elements, or to support social insurance agencies facing severe 
financial  difficulties  due  to  adverse  demographic  imbalances  (e.g.  NAT,  the 
fund  for  sailors),  or  to  comply  with  the  provisions  of  Law  2084  of  1992   4
(stipulating state contribution at 10% of gross earnings to post-1993 entrants), 
considerable sums actually found their way to smaller agencies insuring high 
earners.  Such  subsidies  may  be  direct  (aimed  to  cover  the  large  deficits  of 
currently  or  formerly  state-owned  banks  and  public  utilities  paying  over-
generous pension benefits to retired former employees), but sometimes take 
more covert forms. 
The  case  of  earmarked  indirect  taxes,  euphemistically  known  as  “social 
resources”, is emblematic. These are special surcharges on goods and services, 
whose proceeds are then transferred to the relevant social insurance agency. In 
relative  terms,  such  surcharges  may  provide  a  very  significant  share  of  the 
agency’s  total  resources.  Note  that  Table  2  excludes  surcharges  that  in  all 
intends and purposes are identical to the above, except that they are officially 
classified as employee or employer contributions. Examples of the latter are 
the 1% tax on the cost of public works (in favour of the engineers’ fund), a 
surcharge on the price of newspapers (in favour of the press workers’ funds), a 
surcharge on the cost of legal services (in favour of the notaries’ and lawyers’ 
funds) and so on. Earmarked indirect taxes are a relic of the not-so-distant 
past, when privileged groups lobbied governments for special concessions of all 
sorts (Matsaganis, 2002). 
[TABLE 2] 
As the above  analysis  demonstrates,  the very large  government subsidies to 
social  insurance  pensions  in  Greece  generate  a  “Matthew  effect”  of 
redistribution from the poor to the rich
2. 
This rather quaint feature of the Greek system suggests the contour lines of a 
fairer and more sustainable pension design. In brief, a reformed system would 
pay  a  purely  actuarial  contributory  pension  equating  lifetime  benefits  to 
lifetime contributions. Government support would be redirected from subsidies 
to social insurance pensions towards a self-standing state pension programme. 
Anything from a means-tested minimum pension guarantee to a universal basic 
pension would then be made possible. 
Not surprisingly, this rather simple idea did occur to a few people over the last 
two decades. 
 
3. The evolution of basic pension ideas 
Pension reform has been intermittently on the political agenda since the early 
1990s (Featherstone, 2005; Triantafillou, 2005; Tinios, 2005; Matsaganis, 2007; 
Vlachantoni, 2007; Carrera et al., 2010; Tinios, 2010). Throughout this period, 
                                                 
2 We owe this insight to an anonymous referee.   5
proposals  for  a  reformed  structure,  including  variations  on  a  basic  pension, 
periodically emerged as possible solutions
3. 
Pension  reform  gathered  pace  when  the  conservative  New  Democracy  party 
won the 1990 general election and pledged to reduce the fiscal deficit. Cutting 
pension  spending  was  seen  as  a  key  component  of  the  government’s  fiscal 
consolidation effort. Law 1902 of 1990 provided for rather modest changes, but 
was presented as the first step towards a broader reform that would lead to a 
multi-pillar pension system. However, the original plan for structural reform 
was soon abandoned. The parametric changes brought in by Law 2084 of 1992 
reinforced the logic of the existing system, and the burden of adjustment was 
placed  on  future  generations,  as  the  privileges  of  older  workers  were  left 
almost untouched. 
The socialist party ΠΑΣΟΚ firmly opposed the 1992 reform in opposition, and 
promised to reverse it when back in government. Α radically reformed three-
tier  system,  including  a  tax-funded  basic  pension,  was  advocated  by  Costas 
Simitis, an independent-minded socialist backbencher who later became Prime 
Minister. However, when the party returned to power in 1993, the entire hot 
potato of pension reform was carefully put aside. 
In 1996, after ΠΑΣΟΚ, this time led by Simitis, won another electoral victory, 
pension  reform  reappeared  on  the  political  agenda.  An  expert  committee, 
chaired by Professor John Spraos, was set up with the task to investigate the 
long-term prospects of the Greek pension system. Its report, published in 1997, 
outlined various options for reform and seemed to favour a multi-pillar system, 
including a national pension funded out of general taxation. 
The  report  was  met  with  fierce  opposition  from  trade  unions  and  public 
opinion.  In  view  of  that,  the  government  retreated,  launching  a  dialogue 
dealing mostly with procedural aspects of the existing system. This resulted in 
the introduction of Law 2679 of 1999, dubbed the “mini-pension reform”. Plans 
for a broader pension reform, including a national pension, were once again 
shelved. 
The second term of the Simitis governments (2000-2004) was marked by the 
ambitious,  but  ultimately  failed,  attempt  of  socialist  modernisers  to  reform 
pensions.  The  government  plan,  made  public  in  April  2001,  provided  among 
other things for lower replacement rates, longer contributory records, and a 
uniform retirement age of 65. The main idea of the plan seemed to be the 
elimination  of  privileges  in  treatment  enjoyed  by  some  categories  through 
convergence to the pension rules of IKA, the general regime of private sector 
workers. 
The 2001 plan remained firmly within the boundaries of a public, pay-as-you-
go,  defined-benefit  system.  If  implemented,  Greek  pensions  would  become 
                                                 
3 We thank Platon Tinios for advise on the history of basic pension ideas in Greece.   6
somewhat more viable and considerably less inequitable. Instead, it was widely 
portrayed by unions, opposition parties and the press as “the end of welfare as 
we  know  it”.  As  prominent  figures  of  the  socialist  party  also  took  their 
distance, the government decided to withdraw its pension plan and call, yet 
again, for “social dialogue”. 
A new pension bill was presented to Parliament in June 2002. In the general 
spirit  of  rapprochement  with  the  unions,  the  new  bill  did  not  address  the 
problem of the statutory retirement age. However, because of the extension of 
seniority pensions and the practice of “hard and arduous” occupations to civil 
servants, 2.5 million contributors were expected to retire earlier and another 1 
million to be unaffected as a result (no-one would retire later). No figures were 
forthcoming on the bill’s impact on future deficits, which the “unnecessarily 
harsh” measures of the 2001 plan were to dent by a mere 17.5%. On the whole, 
Law 3029 of 2002 marked a retreat from the timid egalitarianism of the 2001 
plan, leaving the problem of ensuring the long-term viability of Greek pensions 
for future governments to tackle. 
In the meantime, basic pensions came up during the consultation with political 
and social actors attempted by Minister for Labour and Social Insurance Tassos 
Yannitsis in May 2001. While trade unions and opposition parties from left and 
right  refused  to  participate,  two  small  political  formations  made  detailed 
proposals. 
The centre-left AEKA (active from June 2000 to September 2003) presented a 
blueprint for a reformed pension system, whose main tier would be based on 
notional defined contributions, along the lines of the Swedish and the Italian 
systems  after  the  reforms  of  the  mid-1990s  (Hamman,  1997;  Palmer,  2000; 
Whitehouse, 2007; Jessoula, 2009). The first tier would consist in a universal 
Citizens’ Pension, paid to all from age 65, at a total fiscal cost of 4% of GDP. 
Under  this  plan,  government  support  would  be  restricted  to  funding  the 
Citizens’ Pension, and to contribution credits to main-tier pensions in case of 
sickness, maternity and unemployment (AEKA, 2001). 
At about the same time, the centre-right Liberals (active from April 1999 to 
October 2001) presented a similar proposal, except in one crucial aspect. While 
the  main  tier  would  also  be  based  on  notional  defined  contributions, 
government  support  would  be  restricted  to  funding  a  minimum  pension 
guarantee, provided on a means-tested basis from age 65 to those with incomes 
below the 2001 level of minimum pensions (Liberals, 2001). 
Needless to say, nothing came of either of these plans, as Law 3029 of 2002 
removed pension reform from the political agenda – albeit, as it turned out, 
only temporarily. 
The general election of March 2004 ushered in a 5-year interregnum of New 
Democracy rule. Having ascertained the strength of popular sentiment to which 
they themselves had contributed when in opposition, the conservatives were   7
decidedly  unenthusiastic  about  pension  reform.  In  fact,  the  main  piece  of 
legislation  in  this  policy  area  was  Law  3655  of  2008,  which,  even  though 
nominally  consolidated  the  estimated  155  social  insurance  agencies  into  13, 
generally  maintained  the  privileges  of  high-income  groups.  Otherwise,  the 
period was marked by the decision of the European Court of Justice (26 March 
2009) to declare illegal the practice of allowing female civil servants to retire 
earlier  than  their  male  colleagues,  as  well  as  female  workers  in  other 
occupations. It was estimated that as a result of that ruling, the retirement of 
approximately 140,000 female civil servants would have to be postponed by 5 
to 17 years – which, of course, is indicative of the magnitude of privileges in 
the status quo ante. 
 
4. Basic pension (suddenly) on the agenda 
During the election campaign which eventually led to their landslide victory in 
October 2009, the socialists made three promises they must have known they 
would be unable to keep: not to cut pensions, not to raise retirement ages, not 
to change contribution rates. After all, this reassuring position was consistent 
not only with perceived electoral realities, but also with the general drift of 
the  party  manifesto,  pledging  a  bold,  expansionary  economic  policy  of 
Keynesian inspiration, designed to kick-start an era of fast growth. As ΠΑΣΟΚ 
leader  and  current  Prime  Minister  George  Papandreou  affirmed,  money  was 
available – the real question was how to spend it. 
Very soon the music changed. When the government discovered that the public 
deficit  would  be  considerably  higher  than  the  previous  government  had 
admitted, international markets started to demand an ever increasing premium 
in order to buy Greek bonds. The so-called “spread” over German bonds rapidly 
escalated from November 2009: having reached 200 basis points (i.e. 2%) in 
January 2010, it exceeded the 1,000 basis points (i.e. 10%) mark in April 2010. 
At that point, the cost of borrowing from international markets became simply 
prohibitive.  After  much  procrastination  on  all  sides,  an  unprecedented  €110 
billion rescue package was agreed in May 2010 with the European Commission, 
the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, designed to 
cover the borrowing requirements of the country for the next three years. 
In return of the bail-out, the government signed a Memorandum of Economic 
and  Financial  Policies  (ratified  by  Parliament  on  3  May  2010),  whose  terms 
included austerity measures immediately affecting pensions and a far-reaching 
reform of the country’s pension system by September 2010. The future pension 
system ought to include “a means-tested minimum guaranteed income […] to 
protect the most vulnerable” (IMF, 2010). 
In the meantime, Minister of Labour and Social Insurance Andreas Loverdos had 
in December 2009 set up an Experts Committee to advise the government on 
pension reform. The social partners, including the union confederations, were   8
also invited. Nevertheless, Α∆Ε∆Υ (civil servants) declined the invitation from 
the start, while the representatives of ΓΣΕΕ (private sector workers) walked out 
in protest in February 2010. The committee handed in its report on 16 March 
2010. The report made a series of recommendations, but was unable to agree 
on  the  “new  architecture”  of  the  system.  Specifically,  while  it  accepted  in 
principle  the  separation  of  contributory  (“insurance”)  from  non-contributory 
(“assistance”) elements, it failed to specify the exact configuration of basic 
and proportional pensions. 
Following the release of the Experts Committee Report, the government got to 
work on a draft bill on pensions. Given the exceptional circumstances, the bill 
was made public on 10 May, i.e. exactly a week after Parliament ratified the 
Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies the government had signed 
with donors. According to the draft bill, the future system would combine a 
tax-funded basic pension with a contributory proportional pension. 
As far as the basic pension is concerned, rather than determining that it would 
be paid from the same age (e.g. 65), irrespective of when one decides to draw 
his or her proportional pension, the draft bill made the basic pension a mere 
addition  to  the  proportional  pension,  to  be  paid  from  the  same  age  as  the 
latter.  Granting  those  retiring  earlier  the  full  basic  pension,  a  seemingly 
innocuous provision intended to make the new system as similar to the old as 
possible, had undesirable side effects. In the short term, it made the decision 
to retire early financially more attractive. In the long term, it implied basic 
pensions  would  be  paid  for  longer,  and  hence  lifetime  transfers  would  be 
higher,  the  earlier  one  chose  to  retire.  On  the  whole,  by  reintroducing 
unacceptable  differences  in  treatment,  this  provision  clashed  with  equity  – 
while by strengthening the incentive to retire early, it also undermined the 
efficiency objectives of pension reform. 
The final draft of the bill was presented to Parliament on 25 June 2010, and 
was debated in early July. With respect to the proportional pension, accrual 
rates will vary by length of insurance period. The return on contributions will 
range from 0.8% per year for a contributor with less than 15 insurance years, to 
1.5% per year for one with 40 insurance years or more. While the new provision 
eliminates  the  blatant  inequity  of  the  previous  one,  the  risk  that  low-paid 
workers with uncertain career prospects and insecure attachment to the labour 
market might see little incentive to pay pension contributions is still there, 
albeit in less severe form. 
The basic pension, fixed at €360 per month in 2010 prices, paid 12 times a 
year, will be available with no means test to all recipients of a proportional 
pension with a contributory record of at least 15 years. The full rate will be 
payable at age 65, reduced pro rata (by one thirty-fifth a year) for those who 
have been resident in the country for less than 35 years between the ages of 15 
and 65. In cases of early retirement, the basic pension will be paid at a lower 
rate,  reduced  by  6%  per  each  year  short  of  age  65.  Those  with  a  shorter   9
contributory record will still be eligible for the basic pension, but only if they 
pass a means  test: personal income must be  below €5,400 per  year, family 
income  below  €10,800  per  year  (in  2010  prices).  Neither  the  means-tested 
version of the basic pension nor the proportional pension for those with less 
than 15 years of contributions are payable before age 65. 
To allay fears that the new structure may eventually not amount to much, a 
further  safety  net  has  been  introduced  in  the  form  of  a  minimum  pension. 
Specifically, those retiring with an insurance record of at least 15 years will 
have a guaranteed minimum pension equal to the equivalent of 15 minimum 
daily  wages  (as  stipulated  in  the  National  Collective  Labour  Agreement  for 
2015). At present, this would be worth €496 per month. 
On the whole, the reform breaks with the tradition of Bismarckian earnings-
related  social  insurance  and  moves  towards  a  multi-tier  system  separating 
contributory from non-contributory elements. While its first tier falls short of 
full universality, it is the closest to a universal basic pension the Greek pension 
system  has  ever  got.  Nevertheless,  the  value  of  the  basic  pension  remains 
modest.  Indeed,  it  is  below  the  fiscally  sustainable  level  of  a  hypothetical 
universal basic pension paid to all residents aged over 65, which would be €450 
per month approximately at a total cost of 5% of GDP
4. 
 
5. Reactions to the government plan 
The government plan caused great controversy and fierce protests. The final 
version of the bill was first debated at the Parliamentary Committee for Social 
Affairs (from 29 June to 1 July); the opposition parties and the 14 social actors 
invited by the Committee all firmly opposed it. A key objection was that, by 
introducing  a  basic  pension,  the  government  was  no  longer  responsible  for 
guaranteeing an adequate level of contributory pensions. Beyond Parliament, 
the Economic and Social Committee, in a statement released on 5 July, also 
rejected  the  bill,  arguing  among  other  things  that  replacement  rates 
introduced were low, as a result of which the incentives to pay contributions 
were weak. 
On 6 July 2010 the bill was brought to the plenary. In order to soften reactions, 
the government introduced a series of amendments; one of these, placed at 
the very beginning of the text of the bill, assured that “the state guarantees 
the viability of the country’s social insurance system with the aim of ensuring a 
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aged 65+ in 2015 is based on the assumption that GDP will be €243.5 billion in 2010 
prices (as forecast by the IMF), and that the population aged 65+ will be 2.25 million 
(as forecast by Eurostat). Note that using all government subsidies to current pensions 
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decent pension to each beneficiary”. On 8 July, after two days of relentless 
attacks by the opposition, the bill was approved by a narrow majority (159 to 
137),  and  became  Law  3863.  A  week  later,  a  similar  bill  related  to  civil 
servants was also voted in as Law 3865. 
The positions of key political and social actors, based on official documents and 
ad hoc interviews with the relevant spokesmen, are summarised below. 
 
Political actors 
The  main  opposition  party,  conservative  New  Democracy,  had  attempted  to 
conceal its reluctance to be drawn into what it perceived as a vote-losing issue 
behind the (somewhat incongruous) argument that the proper implementation 
of its own Law 3655 of 2008 would ensure the long-run sustainability of the 
system. Being embroiled in an internal fight and a change in leadership after its 
heavy defeat at the polls in October 2009, the party line had been to wait until 
the  pension  bill  was  finalised.  Eventually,  at  Parliament,  the  party  voted 
against the separation of basic from proportional pension, claiming that “there 
should be only one, comprehensive pension”. 
The Communist Party (KKE) rejected the idea of a basic pension financed by 
the state. With respect to the pension bill, the party pledged to “do everything 
in its power to organise a mass popular resistance and counterattack against all 
measures already decided in advance, in accordance with EU guidelines and the 
demands of plutocracy”. It dismissed basic pension as a “funeral benefit”, a 
ploy of government to renege on its financial obligations towards pensioners 
and the working population. 
The far right Popular Orthodox Rally (ΛΑΟΣ) was the only opposition party to 
vote in favour of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, where 
the  required  pension  reform  was  clearly  outlined.  Nevertheless,  the  party 
voted against the pension bill on the grounds that it introduced more severe 
cuts than those implied in the Memorandum. At the parliamentary debate, its 
spokesman reiterated the party’s proposal for a three-pillar pension system, 
including a “national pension, provided to all Greek citizens at the age of 65 
according to their needs” (foreign nationals would be ineligible). 
The Coalition of the Radical Left (ΣΥΡΙΖΑ) opposed the introduction of a new 
pension system separating contributory from non-contributory benefits, on the 
grounds that it would restrict tax funding to the latter, and criticised the low 
level of the basic pension. The party favoured a social insurance system along 
traditional Bismarckian lines. 
The Democratic Left party, founded in June 2010, voted against the pension 
bill as a whole but in favour of specific clauses. The party accepted that the 
previous system was unviable and unfair, criticised the government for failing   11 
completely to eliminate inequalities in treatment, and proposed that the basic 
pension should be made universal and the proportional pension actuarially fair. 
The Greens, represented in the European Parliament, rejected the pension bill. 
The party saw the future pension structure as an attempt to minimise state 
involvement  in  funding  social  insurance.  Its  preferred,  rather  ill-thought, 
pension system consisted of a national, a main and a supplementary pension, 
with tax funding extending to the financing of all three pillars. 
The Liberal Alliance, a small political formation founded in 2007, came out 
against the pension bill in support of a fully-funded system, with government 
subsidies confined to a top-up minimum pension guarantee. 
Finally, Action (yet another tiny liberal party founded in 2009) supported the 
reform on the grounds that “it moves towards the right direction, even though 
it does not touch the heart of the problem”. The party’s preferred solution, 
outlined in a press article
5, involved the complete abolition of social insurance 
contributions and the introduction of a tax-funded universal national pension 
equal to the minimum wage (at €10,395 per year in 2010 prices). 
In short, with few exceptions, political actors failed to engage seriously with 
pension reform, or to propose alternative ways to distribute the costs of fiscal 
adjustment. In a superficial, attention-grabbing manner, they mostly focused 
on losses relative to the status quo. Sensible improvements to the pension bill 
with an eye to sustainability and intergenerational justice were simply not part 
of the political debate. In this context, support for a universal basic pension 
cannot but be weak. 
   
Social actors 
Trade unions are hostile to the idea of a basic pension. The two confederations 
ΓΣΕΕ and Α∆Ε∆Υ view it as part of a move to abolish the existing tripartite 
funding of social insurance. The unions walked out of the experts committee in 
early 2010 and refused to be drawn into the debate on a new pension system 
thereafter. Staunch defenders of current arrangements, they simply called for 
parametric changes and increased funding, through the imposition of new taxes 
and the fight against evasion of social contributions. 
The employer federation (ΣΕΒ) refrained from commenting on the new pension 
structure, even though it had criticised the government for lack of firmness in 
enforcing  the  Memorandum.  In  contrast,  the  Athens  Chamber  of  Commerce 
(EBEA) advocated a notional defined contributions-type main tier, coupled by a 
first-tier means-tested minimum pension guarantee (Tinios, 2009). 
                                                 
5 The article (“We are not quite done with pensions” by Action chairman S. Manos) 
appeared in the Kathimerini daily on 11 July 2010. 
 http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_2_11/07/2010_407645.    12 
The  General  Confederation  of  Artisans,  Craftsmen  and  Tradesmen  (ΓΣΕΒΕ), 
reflecting  the  interests  of  small  employers,  shopkeepers  and  self-employed 
workers, also rejected the idea of a new pension structure, arguing that Law 
2084 of 1992, if fully enforced, would be sufficient to bring the system back to 
equilibrium. 
Finally,  “Generation  €700”  (G700),  a  movement  representing  the  rights  of 
“Greeks aged between 25 and 35, who are overworked, underpaid, debt ridden 
and insecure” came out in favour of redesigning the country’s fragmented and 
unfair pension system. It embraced the idea of a multi-pillar system and was 
generally supportive of the government plan. The movement criticised the bill 
for allowing residual inequalities in treatment.  
To sum up, those who stand to lose most from a transition away from the old 
system  remained  over-represented  in  trade  unions  and  political  parties. 
However, the influence of those arguing for clearer, uniform rules seemed to 
be on the rise.  
 
6. Prospects for a universal basic pension 
Universal basic pensions appeal to a wide constituency because they represent 
an  attractive  component  of  a  successful  pension  design.  Not  depending  on 
previous contributions, they provide a modest income base and an effective 
safety  net  to  all  elderly.  Not  depending  on  other  income  or  assets,  they 
preserve  the  incentives  to  work,  to  save  and  to  pay  contributions  (e.g.  for 
second-tier pensions). The usual objection is, of course, that universal basic 
pensions cost more than, say, means-tested assistance. 
The  evidence  presented  here  flies  in  the  face  of  that  objection.  Somewhat 
paradoxically, the severe economic crisis and the resulting fiscal squeeze have 
made a universal basic pension more realistic, not less, as part of a solution to 
a fairer, financially more sustainable pension system in Greece. 
While falling short of full universality, the new basic pension seems to be an 
acceptable substitute. Proponents of a universal basic pension will be able to 
make  their  case  in  a  radically  improved  institutional  context  –  provided,  of 
course, the country manages to remain solvent. Eliminating the means test for 
those not meeting the contributory condition, and making the basic pension 
payable  from  a  uniform  age,  would  be  the  next  battle  on  the  way  to  full 
universality. 
The risk is that, for all the history of home-grown ideas, public opinion might 
associate  basic  pension  with  the  emergency  conditions  that  led  to  its 
introduction,  in  the  context  of  a  very  unpopular  pension  reform.  If  that 
interpretation  becomes  dominant,  the  basic  pension  could  be  seen  as  an 
“imported idea” promoted by the IMF, to be abandoned as soon as conditions   13 
allow. The effectiveness of the new basic pension in reducing elderly poverty, 
not to mention path dependency, could be powerful forces against such a risk. 
While the Greek case is clearly exceptional, our paper offers at least two more 
general  insights.  The  first  is  that  social  insurance  pensions  may  be  ripe  for 
reform if heavily supported by tax funding in a non-transparent way. Under the 
circumstances, separating contributory components from non-contributory ones 
emerges as an obvious, fair and viable solution. From there, a universal basic 
pension could only be one short step away. 
The second insight is not new, but still worth remembering. Progress towards a 
basic income, or its more modest age-specific variants (universal child benefits 
and universal basic pensions), is likely to be gradual and uneven. There are 
times  when  the  wheels  of  history  turn  very  slowly,  and  others  when  they 
instead seem to spin almost out of control. Basic income ideas may for many 
long years be dismissed as utopian or unworthy of serious consideration. Then, 
suddenly and unpredictably, their force could seem unchallengeable. 
Or, in the words of Philippe Van Parijs (2004, p. 24): 
“Like the fight for universal suffrage, the fight for basic income is 
not an all-or-nothing affair. This is no game for purists and fetishists 
but for tinkerers and opportunists.”   14 
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Tables 
TABLE 1 
Non-contributory components to minimum pensions (2007) 
 
benefit amounts (€ per month) 
all components  non-contributory 
components 
actuarial pension  144.60   
implicit subsidy to actuarial pension    318.58 
minimum pension  463.18   
allowances for a spouse and two 
dependent children     78.06 
minimum pension + family allowances  541.24   
pensioner social solidarity benefit  
ΕΚΑΣ    195.15 
total: minimum pension + family 
allowances +  ΕΚΑΣ  736.39   
all non-contributory components    591.79 
Notes:  The  case  shown  here  refers  to  a  male  worker,  contributing  to  IKA  (the 
largest  social  insurance  agency),  retiring  at  age  65,  with  the  minimum 
contributory record (15 insurance years), a history of low lifetime earnings 
(equal to the minimum wage), the age- and sex-specific life expectancy of 
his cohort (born 1942), at a 2% real rate of return on past contributions, 
and  a  discount  rate  of  future  pension  benefits  also  at  2%.  In  2006  (the 
latest year for which data are available), 60.6% of all IKA retirees received 
the  minimum  pension,  while  26.1%  also  received  the  pensioner  social 
solidarity benefit ΕΚΑΣ. Similar minimum pension mechanisms are present 
in other social insurance agencies. 
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TABLE 2 





% of all 
pension 
spending 
% of GDP 
direct subsidies to social insurance  7,847  26.99  3.28 
IKA (private sector workers)  2,450  8.43  1.02 
ΟGΑ (farmers)  3,555  12.23  1.49 
ΟΑΕΕ (self-employed)  300  1.03  0.13 
NAT (sailors)  1,050  3.61  0.44 
other agencies (mostly high earners)  492  1.69  0.21 
earmarked indirect taxes  1,532  5.27  0.64 
IKA (private sector workers)  85  0.29  0.04 
ΟGΑ (farmers)  633  2.18  0.26 
ΟΑΕΕ (self-employed)  60  0.21  0.03 
other agencies (mostly high earners)  754  2.59  0.32 
state contribution to post-1993 
entrants  2,563  8.82  1.07 
civil servants  1,268  4.36  0.53 
ΟGΑ (farmers)  510  1.75  0.21 
ΟΑΕΕ (self-employed)  415  1.43  0.17 
other agencies (mostly high earners)  370  1.27  0.15 
implicit subsidies to state pensions  2,148  7.39  0.90 
ΕΚΑΣ  1,080  3.72  0.45 
total government subsidies  15,170  52.19  6.34 
Notes:  Direct  subsidies  to  social  insurance  exclude  subsidies  to  social  health 
insurance. Earmarked indirect taxes are special surcharges on goods and 
services, whose proceeds are transferred to the relevant social insurance 
agency,  and  do  not  include  similar  surcharges  officially  classified  as 
employee  contributions.  State  contribution  to  post-1993  entrants,  in 
compliance with the provisions of Law 2084 of 1992, are fixed at 10% of 
gross earnings. Implicit subsidies to state pensions are net, i.e. exclude 
state contribution to post-1993 entrants to the labour market, employee 
contributions, and implicit employer contributions (calculated at 13.33% of 
gross earnings, i.e. the same rate as IKA). The pensioner social solidarity 
benefit ΕΚΑΣ is an income-tested supplement to low pensions, reserved for 
recipients  of  a  contributory  pension  from  any  social  insurance  agency 
except ΟΓΑ (farmers). 
 